I. Introduction
The regulation of international relations stands at a crossroad: as American and British bombers fly against Baghdad, the fate of being reduced to debris and ashes is not merely faced by a single state under tyrannical rule; it may also threaten the international legal system as we have known it since the end of the Second World War. The United States are not only challenging an Arab dictator, but also valid international law -and apparently with no regard for the potential consequences.
In my article, I first intend to describe the current situation under international law. To this end, I outline the basic peacekeeping system of the United Nations. I then present the grounds for admissible use of force and specifically address the conditions under which a preemptive military strike might occur in accordance with the law. In a second part I draw attention to the consequences which might ensue from the American strategy of preemptive war for the future development of international law.
II. The Use of Force in International Law and the War Against Iraq

The Maintenance of Peace under Current International Law
The maintenance of peace under international law is based on a doctrine from which all other pertinent rules are derived: the general prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter. As a rule, the use of military force between states is prohibited.
International law sanctions warfare; it follows that war is not permissible as an instrument for the enforcement of political interests. Of course, this principle of international law does not in itself guarantee peace. Laws can be broken, and clearly, many wars have been fought since this prohibition of the use of force became part of international law. If peace is to be secured with the means of law, however, then the prohibition of war becomes a necessary condition.
That, at least, is the basic idea reflected in the Charter of the United Nations.
Peace can be understood, first and foremost, as an absence of war. Pax est absentia belli.
Coupled with the guarantee of territorial integrity and the political independence of states, the prohibition of the use of force safeguards the international status quo, regardless of how inadequate or unjust the latter may appear. Admittedly, the Charter of the United Nations has also embraced the assumption that only a just peace can become a lasting peace, 2 and that unjust circumstances such as a consistent violation of human rights or the denial of selfdetermination pose a source of conflict which can, in turn, breed wars. Still, achieving a "just peace" in the sense defined by Immanuel Kant, 3 that is: an international state of affairs in which the very reason for war is lacking, is not an objective which can stand as an alternative to the prohibition of the use of force. Instead, it relies on that prohibition for its very foundation. Potential sources of conflict between states should be resolved, but by peaceful means only. This remains valid even when the conflict originates in a serious violation of international law by one of the parties to the conflict. In principle, even valid international law may not be enforced by means of force. The U.N. Charter contains only two exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force:
the right to self-defense contained in Article 51, on the one hand, and collective action initiated by the Security Council within the framework Chapter VII, on the other. That
Chapter provides for "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." The basis for military sanctions is outlined in Article 42, which authorizes the Security Council to use air, sea, or land forces to "maintain or restore international peace and security" once it has established a threat to or breach of the peace pursuant to Article 39.
Under United Nations practice, the Security Council may delegate the implementation of such measures to Member States. 4 The prohibition of the use of force and the rules authorizing it follow a pattern of rule and exception. If a state proposes to use military force against another state, it must be able to draw on some form of justification, which, in turn, can only be derived from the right to selfdefense or an authorization granted by the Security Council.
The war waged by the United States against Iraq without an additional resolution of the Security Council would thus only be legitimate if the U.S. had been entitled to exercise its right of self-defense or if the Security Council had already given a prior mandate for such military action. As the Bush-Administration argues, both conditions have been met: it contends that the existing resolutions already contain an authorization of the use of force, while it also believes itself entitled to act in legitimate self-defense.
Has the Security Council Issued an Authorization?
A good starting point for any answer to this question are the actual resolutions adopted by the Security Council. The resolution around which the current inspection regime is built is 
The Right to Self-Defense
It still remains to be seen whether the United States government is entitled to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, as it has previously maintained.
a) Does a Right to Preemptive Self-Defense Exist?
Under Article 51, the right to self-defense arises "if an armed attack occurs." It cannot currently be claimed that Iraq has been attacking the United States or any other state. The question can therefore only center on whether Article 51 also grants a right to self-defense against a future attack. In other words, is there a right to "preemptive self-defense"?
International legal scholarship has essentially embraced two main points of view. As one group of authors maintains, Article 51 should be interpreted narrowly, being, as it is, an exception from the general prohibition of the use of force. A more extensive interpretation would be too prone to abuse. Consequently, strict adherence to the wording of this provision is called for, with self-defense clearly dependent on a prior attack. An attack must, therefore, already have begun. 11 10 For further details, consult Schaller (supra, note 7), 645-656, who provides a thorough analysis of the individual resolutions with convincing arguments. Schaller also demonstrates that later resolutions provides no implied authorization, and that the Security Council always assumed the continued existence of the cease-fire regime. This situation has not been changed by S.C. Res. 1441 Res. (2002 . While it may refer to S.C. Res. 678 (1990) and 687 (1991) , and again affirm a material breach of Res. 687 fest, it does not lift the cease-fire, but rather provides Iraq with a renewed opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations (paras 2, 3 As the other view contends, reflecting what is probably a majority opinion, such an interpretation would be too formalistic and hard to reconcile with reality. Whoever fires the first shot is not always the aggressor. No state can be expected to stand by and idly watch until the preparations for an attack finally result in an actual strike, preventing an effective defense. The right of states to self-defense is based on their right to existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article 51 presupposes and recognizes it as an "inherent right." It may not be interpreted in such a manner that self-defense would be rendered useless in a given case, forcing a state to effectively surrender its integrity without being able to launch a defense. 12 If self-defense can thus, under certain circumstances, become admissible even before an enemy has fired the first shot or sent his troops across the border, those circumstances have to be understood narrowly. Otherwise, the right to self-defense might grow to become a general authorization of the use of force.
The boundaries of preemptive self-defense have been elaborated in international legal scholarship with a view both to customary law and contextual interpretation. Apparently, international custom allows preemptive self-defense if -and only when -the state invoking it can demonstrate that the threat of a hostile attack is both immediate and overwhelming, ruling out a lengthy search for peaceful means of resolution, provided no defense other than military force is available. This rule can be traced back to the Caroline-case. The Caroline was a steamer used in 1837 by a private militia from the United States to bring arms and men to an island on the Canadian side of the Niagara river so as to support a rebellion in what was at that time still a British colony. The British captured the steamer while it was still moored on the American side, put it on fire and let it drift downstream past the Niagara Falls. In a diplomatic note issued in 1841, 13 18 In ordinary language, a distinction is often made between "preventive" and "preemptive" self-defense. In the foregoing defense situation, "preemptive self-defense" would be legitimate self-defense, while "preventive self-defense" would denote a form of defense against threats which are neither imminent nor can be proved, see, e.g., Senator Edward Kennedy, 148 Cong. Rec. S10001, S10002 (October 7, 2002) .
19 Some authors suggest not using "preventive", but rather "anticipatory" self-defense when referring to cases of legitimate and preemptive self-defense, so as to distinguish these from the area of general threats dealt with by the Security Council, see, e.g., O'Connell (supra, note 17), 2, at note 10.
20 See supra, note 11, for sources denying such self-defense in the first place. 
The American Claim of Preemptive Action
The Bush-Administration is aware of the fact that a preemptive war launched against Iraq without a U.N. mandate is illegal. As it has nonetheless decided to embark on this course of 25 It cannot be reduced to a mere statement made spontaneously and without deliberation. The National Security Strategy outlines a set of basic principles, and it will determine the guidelines of American security policy for many years to come.
The new strategy departs from previous means of peacekeeping, which used to be based on containment and deterrence. According to the new strategy, the events of September 11
showed that containment and deterrence no longer sufficed to address international terrorism.
A terrorist determined to commit suicide cannot be deterred by threats of massive retaliation.
And containment cannot be applied against dictators who own weapons of mass destruction and might use them in missile warheads or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. The battle must therefore be taken to the enemy. An attack is the best defense. 26 If necessary, liberty and life of Americans would have to be defended against "rogue states" by way of preemptive action. 27 Against such states, mere reaction is no longer a viable strategy. "We cannot let our enemies strike first", as the National Security Strategy puts it.
But then, that document explicitly makes reference to international law: it correctly states, for one, that states threatened with an immediate attack are not held to suffer the attack before they may act against hostile armed forces in legitimate defense. That statement is followed by a decisive passage: "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." In the case of "rogue states", the criterion of an imminent threat is now supposedly to be understood as the mere possibility that these might use weapons of mass destruction at some future point. In other words, the requirement of immediacy is purged: the intention of an actual attack no longer needs to be established.
The Bush-Doctrine violates international law. It is, however, meant to create new international law. Against the background of the National Security Strategy, the current war against Iraq could be a first step. New international law arises from state practice coupled with opinio iuris, the acceptance of such practice as reflecting the law. 28 The National Security Strategy contains a statement about the law. In essence, what the U.S. government is claiming is that, given novel types of threats to peace, the conditions for an invocation of the right to self-defense have to be reinterpreted so as to allow preemptive action. Accordingly, 
Anarchy Instead of a Prohibition of the Use of Force?
What would support such changes in international law? Is George W. There is no denying that law will lose its capacity to secure peace and order if it fails to provide effective protection against existential threats. But is a legalization of preemptive war the only viable solution?
This is not the forum to discuss strategic and political alternatives to a preemptive military strike, its negative consequences and countervailing effects, the political and military pros and cons. From a legal point of view, the only question that may be addressed here is whether the authority to launch preemptive strikes should remain a prerogative of the Security Council, or whether it is preferable to confer such authority on every state that feels threatened as part of the right to self-defense.
The very existence of these two alternatives already makes it obvious that the current legal system is not powerless against threats emanating from "rogue states." It does, however, require a Security Council decision, which -as experience has taught us -is not always easy to come by, particularly due to the veto capacity of its five permanent members. Of course, the United States government does not want to see Russia, China or Pakistan embarking on preemptive wars wherever and whenever they choose. And the National Security Strategy expressly warns them: "Nations should not use preemption as a pretext for aggression." The U.S. itself on the other hand will only engage in just wars: "The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just", as the same document explains. Other states, however, are likely to abuse such action -with preemptive defense perhaps being used as a pretext for resource interests, just to name one example?
That is why the Bush-Doctrine can only be understood as formulating a right to preemptive military strikes not for all states, but for the United States only; this is not explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy, but can be inferred from the constellation of interests under which it was formulated. 31 The United States has become aware of its capacity as the sole remaining superpower. And the U.S. government is determined to use the historical moment of opportunity. If the authority to lead preemptive wars is granted only to the United States, good will prevail against evil, as will democracy and freedom against oppression and tyranny. 32 Security will be the outcome, and the insecurity and anarchy resulting from all other states enjoying the same right avoided.
Is that the solution to all problems of international security and world peace we are currently facing? Should we not accept the United States as a "benign hegemon", as the only power with an ability to secure peace and resolve conflicts? And is not the United States, at the same The numerous political problems these questions entail cannot be dealt with here.
Nevertheless, a fundamental legal problem should be pointed out: were the international community to grant the United States an exclusive authority to lead preemptive wars against "rogue states", the sovereign equality of states -a further core principle of the current international law (Article 1 (2), 2 (1) of the U.N. Charter) -would be attenuated in favor of a privileged status of the United States. The legitimizing principle of equality before the law would be breached -a step backwards to a time before the Age of Enlightenment. Inequality of power would be rewarded and sustained by inequality before the law. That might even result in an erosion of the very notion of equality before the law. What no longer applies between states -could it still be upheld within states as a legitimizing principle?
IV. Summary
Against the background of the National Security Strategy, a preventive war of the United
States against Iraq possesses revolutionary character -at least if a majority of states tolerate it without objecting. It can unravel the current peacekeeping regime in international law and replace a proven, if admittedly flawed, system with one which would not yet permit an assessment of whether it might develop towards international anarchy or towards a global American hegemony. Considering the current allocation of power, the latter appears more likely, at least for now. But the hegemonic position requested by the United States, and its observance by the community of states, would disavow the principle of equality before the law, a precept which has been the basis of law since the Age of Enlightenment. If that outcome is to be avoided, a multilateral approach involving a stronger position of United Nations Security Council will be called for. 33 At length Schroeder (supra, note 22).
